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Abstract 
Self Aware Computer Systems is an area of basic research, 
and we are only in the initial stages of our understanding of 
what it means: What it means to be self aware; what a self 
aware system can do that a system without it cannot do; and 
what are some of the immediate practical applications and 
challenge problems. This paper is a report capturing some of 
the salient points discussed during the DARPA workshop on 
Self Aware Computer Systems held on April 27-28, 2004 in 
Washington DC.1  
Introduction: What is Self Awareness? 
In humans, self-awareness is described and defined in 
many different ways.  For instance, knowledge about one’s 
own permanent aspects or of one’s relationships to others; 
awareness of one’s sensory experiences and their 
implications; awareness of one’s beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and goals; knowledge about one’s own 
knowledge or lack thereof; awareness of one’s attitudes 
such as hopes, fears, regrets and expectations; and the 
ability to perform mental actions such as forming or 
dropping an intention (McCarthy, 2004). 
In machines, self-awareness is likely to be of interest 
only for long-lived programs – programs that operate over 
a period of time, and potentially interact with the external 
world or other programs.  Machines do not have to be self-
aware in the same ways as humans are, but some forms of 
self-awareness will be useful for machines to have.  For 
example, a machine may need to reason about what it can 
and cannot do; reason about ways to achieve new 
knowledge and abilities; know how it arrived at its current 
beliefs, maintain a critical view of them, and use this 
knowledge to revise its beliefs in light of new information; 
                                                 
1 The position statements submitted by various participants are 
available online at http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/DWSAS-
statements.html, and the presentations made during the workshop 
are available at http://www-formal.stanford.edu/eyal/aware. 
regard its entire mental state up to the present as an object, 
and have the ability to transcend it, think about it; etc. 
Self-awareness also seems to have a social aspect.  For 
instance, a system may have a theory of itself that it can 
use to interact with others.  Such self-awareness may have 
uses in multi-agent systems for dealing with errors in 
communication, argumentation, negotiation, etc.  Consider 
the kinds of self-awareness that would be involved in the 
ability not just to say “When I said ‘X’ I meant ‘Y’”, but to 
know when it would be appropriate to do so. 
Such an ability suggests a degree of self-awareness that 
no system currently has. There are some simple forms of 
awareness that systems do have. For example, many 
systems monitor their battery level, or their amount of 
available memory; systems are able to produce a 
processing trace, to engage in garbage collection, etc. 
Thus, to focus attention on the sorts of self-aware systems 
we have in mind, it is useful to make an explicit distinction 
between the following notions: 
Explicit Self-Awareness. The computer system has a 
full-fledged self-model that represents knowledge about 
itself (its autobiography, current situation, activities, 
abilities, goals, knowledge, intentions, knowledge about 
others’ knowledge of its knowledge, etc) in a form that 
lends itself to use by its general reasoning system and can 
be communicated (possibly in some language) by a general 
reasoning system. 
Self-Monitoring. The computer system monitors, 
evaluates, and intervenes in its internal processes, in a 
purposive way. This does not presuppose that the 
monitored information lends itself to general reasoning; in 
fact, there may be no general reasoning (e.g., operating 
systems, insects). 
Self-Explanation.  The agent can recount and justify its 
actions and inferences. In itself, this does not presuppose a 
full-fledged self-model, or integration of knowledge 
needed for self explanation into a general reasoning 
capability. 
The primary focus of the workshop, and the area that we 
suggest is fruitful for basic research, is the notion of 
explicit self-awareness: what it is, how to implement it, 
and what it is good for. Note that although one of the 
attractions of work in self-aware systems is the promise 
that self-awareness can play a role in helping systems be 
more adaptive and robust, these properties do not 
themselves presuppose or necessarily require explicit self-
awareness, or even general reasoning. Many researchers 
expect, however, that self-awareness will be required for 
increasing degrees and different kinds of adaptivity and 
robustness than are displayed by current systems. 
Likewise, although properties such as self-monitoring, self-
explanation, and goal-directedness are likely to be present 
in self-aware computer systems, these by themselves do 
not constitute self-awareness. The system may, however, 
exhibit self-awareness in the way it marshals these 
abilities, for example, in choosing what to monitor, or by 
knowing that it is garbage collecting (and why). 
As a concrete example of what a self-aware computer 
system can do that a system without self-awareness cannot 
do, consider (McCarthy, 1996): 
 
• A fish cannot, while not swimming, review its 
previous swimming performance so as to swim 
better next time. 
 
• A fish cannot take instruction from a more 
experienced fish in how to swim better. 
 
• A fish cannot contemplate designing a fish better 
adapted to certain swimming conditions than it is. 
 
A self aware swimming robot would be able to perform all 
the three tasks listed above. 
Neuroscientific Viewpoint on Self-Awareness 
The neuroscience view on self-awareness is driven by the 
observation that at any given time humans seem to be 
aware of only a small fraction of what they know; most 
cognitive processing seems to go one below the threshold 
of awareness.  Moreover, human self-awareness seems to 
be largely mismatch driven: we become more aware of our 
thoughts, behavior, etc. when our expectations for 
experience are violated.  
One way of implementing some of these features of self-
awareness in a machine would be with an architecture 
called the Global Workspace (GW)—a massively parallel 
society of specialized processors coupled with a central 
information exchange (the “workspace”) (Baars, 1988). 
Executive controls (“self systems”) can be implemented to 
monitor and control large sets of specialized processors. 
These processors would normally operate semi-
autonomously, outside of central awareness, but 
expectation violations might cause their operations to rise 
above the threshold and attract the “attention” of higher-
level control systems. 
The neuroscientific view raises a number of unanswered 
questions, for example, Can awareness be caused by 
complexity in situations and not just by mismatches?  Can 
we distinguish amongst species based on consciousness?   
Why does the brain appear to be neurologically serial? 
Psychological Viewpoint on Self-Awareness 
In psychology, there are two main current areas of research 
relevant to self-awareness.  The first, deriving primarily 
from the work of Piaget, focuses on the development of a 
sense of self over one’s lifetime (Rochat, 2003).  Research 
suggests that infants are born with a rudimentary concept 
of self, manifested in such simple things as differentiating 
a self-touch from the touch of another. At around 18 
months infants manifest a more “conceptual” sense of self, 
supporting the ability to recognize themselves in a mirror.  
Other milestones include the ability to recognize that what 
they believe and what someone else believes may be 
different, which generally happens by 4 to 5 years.  
The other line of research originates in more recent 
cognitive psychology, and focuses on the monitoring and 
executive control of cognitive processes (Nelson, 1992). In 
the general account of metacognitive monitoring and 
control, cognition occurs at two levels: object level and 
meta level.  Object level cognition is “normal” cognition 
performed in direct support of achieving some goal: 
planning a birthday party, memorizing vocabulary words, 
and the like.  Meta level cognition monitors and controls 
object level processes.  Monitoring involves functions like 
judging the completeness of a plan, or the degree of 
confidence that one has learned something (making a 
“judgement of learning”).  Control involves using this 
information to do such things as starting or stopping 
processes, selecting or altering strategies, allocating time 
between processes, etc. 
Having surveyed some of the general questions and 
issues involved in understanding self-awareness, we will 
spend the rest of this report focusing on the challenges 
involved in formalizing and implementing self-awareness 
in computational systems.  The next section outlines a few 
examples of existing systems and discusses the degree to 
which they implement self-awareness.  This is followed by 
a section discussing open research questions, and a section 
on challenge problems that will hopefully serve to spur 
interest in self-aware systems, and result in significant 
advances in the state of the art. 
Implemented Systems 
There are examples of implemented systems that exhibit 
features of self-aware computer systems. We give here a 
description of each system and what makes it self-aware. 
Several systems have been developed at the University of 
Maryland based on the idea of a Meta-Cognitive Loop 
(MCL) (Anderson and Perils, 2005). The meta cognitive 
loop has three main steps (1) monitor events, to note 
possible anomalies (deviations from expectations) (2) 
assess the type and possible strategies for dealing with any 
anomalies, and  (3) guide one or more strategies into place 
while continuing to monitor (looping back to step 1) for 
new anomalies that may arise either in the normal course 
of operation, or as part of the repair strategy.  MCL allows 
systems to reason about their own performance failures, 
and to make targeted changes to their own modules 
(including learning new things) to improve performance. In 
one study it was shown that the performance of standard 
reinforcement-learning algorithms, which tend to recover 
slowly when there is a sudden change in reward structure, 
can be significantly enhanced when coupled with even a 
minimal form of MCL. 
The CASSIE system, developed at SUNY Buffalo, is an 
autonomous agent with a natural language front end 
(Shapiro, 1989).  Its representation includes a term to 
represent itself (an “I”), and it has the ability to represent 
and refer to its own beliefs and actions. It uses a first order 
logic representation called SNePS. Functionally, Cassie 
has beliefs about herself and others, knows with whom she 
is talking, can remember and report on her actions using 
appropriate tense and aspect, can be informed about the 
actions of others, and can properly use certain deictic terms 
such as I, you, and here. 
The KRAKEN system, developed by Cycorp, is a 
knowledge acquisition front end to the Cyc knowledge 
base (Witbrock, et al. 2003).  The acquisition proceeds by 
system asking the user questions.  In the initial versions of 
KRAKEN, the system had limited self-awareness 
capabilities: it did not know why or how it was asking 
questions; it did not substantially distinguish the current 
discourse context from the general knowledge base; and it 
was only dimly aware of the person with whom it was 
communicating. This substantially reduced the 
effectiveness of the knowledge formation process. Since 
the system had no represented goals, it was unable to 
decide whether asking a particular question best satisfied 
those goals. Its questions to the user had no context, 
because of which it could not choose the best way to ask 
them, or frame its questions in terms of preceding and 
subsequent interactions. Finally, the system could not 
recognize that its questions may be annoying the user, 
because it did not really know what its questions are, or 
what effect they might have.  
To address these shortcomings, Cycorp is taking some 
first steps towards implementing self-awareness in 
KRAKEN. They are approaching this problem by 
representing and reasoning about the system itself within 
the knowledge base. KRAKEN now keeps a record of user 
utterances, their interpretations, the information presented 
by the system to the user, etc.  In short, it keeps a formal 
representation of the entire interaction that can be reasoned 
with.  These facilities will serve as the basis for structuring 
interactions with the user. 
Research Issues 
In this section, we consider some scientific challenges that 
need to be addressed in the development of self-aware 
computer systems. 
Knowledge Representation 
The basic ability to represent knowledge is clearly 
necessary for building self-aware computer systems. More 
importantly, self-aware systems need to represent 
knowledge about their knowledge. Aspects of self-
awareness that require such representations include 
planning under uncertainty, problem diagnosis, decision 
explanation, collaborative or adversarial interactions with 
multiple agents, and exploration of new domains.  
More technically, the sorts of knowledge representation 
required to support self-awareness include the ability to 
represent knowledge and beliefs as modal operators; the 
representation of self and other agents; the representation 
of sensing and observing; memory operations such as 
forgetting, recalling, and recognition; the ability to 
represent conceptual objects (such as beliefs per se); the 
ability to represent and reason about emotions; and the 
ability to represent a naïve or folk psychology.  Specific 
research in knowledge representation under the following 
themes seems to be central for self-aware computer 
systems: 
• A focus on under-researched issues such as 
memory; focus of attention; contradiction 
resolution; expansion of vocabulary with new 
information and situations; changes in the system 
and its beliefs; emotion; and folk-psychology. 
• Integration of traditional KR areas (e.g., sensing, 
knowledge, & non-monotonicity). 
Self and Social Agency 
Much of human self-knowledge seems to involve thinking 
of the self as a social agent, an agent that makes promises, 
commitments, etc. This involves a kind of self-awareness 
that depends in part on awareness that the agent is itself 
perceived by other ‘selves’. This observation raises the 
following questions: Is this social dimension important or 
central, and how does it relate to other self-notions, such as 
the bodily self? What kind of analogous social assumptions 
would be appropriate for an artificial self-aware system? 
We can distinguish two notions of self-aware, roughly 
distinguished as the social-agent sense and the monitoring-
executive sense. The first sees the person as primarily an 
agent in a community of agents and the self as the locus of 
social commitment. The second sees the person as an 
isolated body/mind with the self as a locus of internal 
observation (introspection) and executive control. In 
humans these are identified, but are conceptually distinct 
and so could be distinguished in artificial systems. For 
example, consider a Question-Answering system with no 
body or bodily location, or a distributed robotic system.  
Although there may be many systems that do not require 
much in the way of social awareness—for example, a 
toaster oven does not need to consider social aspects of its 
actions (toasting)—there are also examples of systems, 
such as medical advisers for long-term medical care, 
artificial pets, personal assistants, medical ‘companions’ 
for elderly people, where it seems essential to model the 
self as a social agent. And even the toaster oven may find 
some social awareness useful, if for instance it uses 
indicators (e.g. a red light or a bell), it might use social 
awareness to choose between them, or even use other 
indicators, if it knows that the target of a given indication 
does not know its meaning or is not aware of it.   
Engineering Self-Sustainable Systems 
A self-sustaining system is any combination of hardware 
and software that is able to notice errors, inefficiencies, 
and other problems in its own behavior and resources, and 
to repair them on the fly. We imagine that such systems 
could be quite large and that they might exhibit both 
hardware and software failures. This means that some of 
the failures will be intermittent or based on coincidences—
of placement, of timing, and of naming.  
Self-sustainability and self-awareness appear to be 
related at an implementation level, but perhaps also 
conceptually. A self-sustaining system performs some 
degree of reflection and can alter its own behavior based 
on what it sees, and this is what a self-aware system does. 
We can draw inspiration from how biological systems 
sustain themselves.  Biological systems maintain diversity, 
redundancy, biological modularity (codes can change), 
spatial compartmentalization (cells keep things physically 
together), stigmergy (making changes, observing, and 
making changes again, but still having state), 
symbiogenesis (combining genetic material), growing, 
staying alive, etc. Software systems face a different set of 
challenges; for example, they need to maintain modularity 
in the face of changing context, they need to dynamically 
adapt, etc.  Most organisms require different types of 
feedback and so will programs. 
One approach to engineering self-sustaining programs is 
to implement an observational, programmable layer that 
not only observes, interrupts, and alters, but that consists of 
decaying persistent memory. For example, consider a 
tightly packed multiprocessor that can suffer heat-related 
failures when heavy-duty computations take place on it. 
Imagine an observational layer that is monitoring heat and 
memory or computation failure rates. If the observational 
memory were to hold data about the heat or failure rate and 
treat it like dissipating heat or dissolving chemicals, then 
adjacent memory and computational elements would 
“inherit” some of the characteristics of the problems and 
computations would not be scheduled onto them as 
frequently, thereby reducing errors by moving 
computations away from overheated areas. 
Engineering self-sustainable systems can be a concrete 
practical application of self-awareness.  It is not apparent if 
such systems will require notions such as beliefs, and 
representations of self that were traditionally studied in 
formal knowledge representation, but they certainly can 
use concepts such as the Meta-Cognitive Loop. 
Cognitive Architecture  
One can think of the architecture of a self-aware computer 
system from three perspectives: (1) an autonomous agent 
view, (2) an information processing view, and (3) a 
biological view.  Each view suggests a different set of 
components.  
From an autonomous agent view, a self-aware system 
must have sensors, effectors, memory (including 
representation of state), conflict detection and handling, 
reasoning, learning, goal setting, and an explicit awareness 
of any assumptions. The system should be reactive, 
deliberative, and reflective. 
From an information processing view, a self-aware 
system worries about provenance of information (where 
the information came from (self, other)), reference of 
information (what the information pertains to (self, other)), 
the use of information (who can use the information (self, 
other)), and the intention of use (what is the information 
used to affect (self, other)). 
From the biological viewpoint, a self-aware system is a 
decentralized system (as opposed to centralized e.g., a 
parliament or theater model), and components have an 
executive-slave relationship. The influence of this view on 
the engineering of the system is not obvious. 
The unifying theme among these three perspectives is 
that the system can use the information about self, 
environment, and the history of its actions to reason about 
its future actions, giving different performance for different 
degrees of self-awareness. 
In addition to these general architectural considerations, 
there are some specific issues for the design of memory in 
self-aware systems.  The first issue is the question of what 
information to acquire. It is pretty clear that information 
acquisition in humans is highly selective, goal-driven, and 
based on judgments of relevance.  Might it be possible to 
leverage self-awareness and self-models to implement 
these properties in computer memory systems? For 
instance, a system might decide what to learn based on its 
assessment of current needs. 
The next issue concerns retrieval.  A great deal of work 
needs to be done to understand different content-based 
organizational schemes (episodic memory based on 
individual narrative experience; semantic memory based 
on conceptual relations) to allow efficient retrieval of 
related information.  One research question is how a self-
model might be useful as an organizing framework for, or 
play some other role in, structuring memory. 
Finally, there is the question of forgetting. Assuming 
limited storage capacity and a time-cost to retrieval that 
increases with KB size, some information is going to need 
to be deleted sometimes. A self-aware system should be 
able to make intelligent choices about what to retain and 
what to discard.   
Challenge Problems  
Challenge problems identify specific measurable tasks that 
can be used to drive the research and to measure progress.  
Here are some example problems that will require a system 
to have self-awareness. 
Expertise identification. A self-aware system is capable 
of reasoning about its own knowledge, and about the 
knowledge of others.  Such ability can be of great practical 
interest in locating expertise on specific topics. For 
example, consider the following question: 
Did anyone use radar to identify landmarks in the 
DARPA vehicle challenge problem? A self-aware system 
may reason with it as follows: (1) I do not know (2) I need 
to find someone who does know (3) Sebastian Thrun may 
know or may know someone who does know. 
 An example of a practical system where such queries 
will make lot of sense is the LinkedIn network 
(http://www.linkedin.com) which is a social network where 
people advertise their interests and capabilities as well as 
who their contacts are.   
Conversation. Extended human conversation seems to 
require representation of one’s intentions, of the expected 
effects of one’s utterances, and the state of one’s 
conversational partner, of one’s own comprehension of 
their utterances, etc.  It also seems to involve modeling of 
the self as a social agent, that is, an agent for whom there 
are expectations, such as conversational norms and 
etiquette. This is especially true in areas where success 
depends on establishing an enduring relationship with 
human participants, for example, medical advisers for 
long-term medical care, artificial pets, personal assistants, 
‘companions’, etc. 
Kriegspiel Chess.  Kriegspiel Chess is a variant of chess 
that requires participants to reason about what they do and 
don’t know, and what their opponent does and doesn’t 
know. The game requires three boards—one for each 
player and one for a referee. The main idea of Kriegspiel is 
that players see only their own pieces, and do not know 
exactly what moves the opponent has made—they only 
have some partial information (see below) that allows them 
to guess where the opponent’s pieces are. Only the referee 
knows exactly the real position of both sets of pieces.  
Players move turn-wise, just as in normal chess. Each 
turn, a player attempts a move. When this move is legal, 
the referee announces that the player has moved, and the 
turn is done. When the move is not legal, the referee  
announces that the player attempted an illegal move, and 
the player must make a new attempt to move, until he 
makes a legal move. All announcements by the referee are 
heard by both players.  
When a piece captures another piece, the referee 
announces this, and also the field where the capture has 
taken place. For instance, the referee could announce: 
White has captured on d3. The referee announces neither 
the type of piece captured, nor piece executing the capture. 
There is one exception to this rule, namely en-passant 
capture, in which a pawn takes another pawn. In this case, 
the referee would announce, for instance: Black has taken 
en-passant on f3.  
To avoid players having to make long series of wrong 
guesses about pawn captures each turn, a player may ask: 
Are their any pawn captures? The referee either answers 
No, if the player cannot capture a piece with a pawn, or 
Try!, if there are one or more possible capturing moves 
with a pawn. In the latter case, the player must make at 
least one attempt to capture with a pawn (if unsuccessful, 
the player may continue such attempts or attempt other 
moves at will).  
If a player makes moves that he knows are illegal (for 
instance, asking about pawn captures when he has no 
pawns left), the referee says Impossible, so that the 
opponent is not confused by this.  
When a move gives check, the referee announces this, 
and also announces the direction in which check is given: 
either on the row, on the column, on the small diagonal, on 
the large diagonal, or by a knight. However, the location of 
the checking piece is not announced. 
Kriegspiel chess is a focused challenge problem for 
reasoning about knowledge and lack of knowledge that can 
serve a role that traditional chess did in early days of AI. 
Semantic-Web Services. These services can retrieve 
information from world-wide-web sources when they need 
to, and use this knowledge to plan and execute actions that 
contribute to goal achievement. Self-awareness is required 
in such services because the knowledge that is available in 
a web source can be about the availability of other 
knowledge in a different location. For example, one source 
(e.g., Yahoo!’s website) can tell the system that it can find 
out more about computers if it goes to manufacturers’ 
websites. In turn, those can refer the system to another 
source, depending on the information that is needed more 
specifically (e.g., technical or purchase information). The 
system needs to be aware of its own knowledge, the effects 
of receiving and keeping new knowledge, and how 
changes to its knowledge should be retracted if it turns out 
that the new knowledge is inaccurate or false. 
Automated tutoring systems. Such systems display a 
sequence of lessons to a student, and adjust their teaching 
level and questions/answers to the student level, as 
perceived by the system. The conversation between the 
human and the system is not always in natural language, 
but instead could use different modalities, such as sounds 
and graphical interfaces. The perception of the system and 
its decision on its actions depend to a large extent on the 
state the user is in, and the student’s state depends to a 
large extent on its perception of the system’s state. Thus, 
the system should take into account its own internal state, 
the state of its knowledge, and its belief about the state of 
its knowledge as perceived by the user. 
Poker playing. In poker (e.g., Texas Hold’em) there are 
multiple players who need to bid given their observations 
of their own cards and other players’ bids. It is important to 
maintain a view of the likely cards held by the opponents 
given their bids, as well as the system’s perception of its 
opponents’ beliefs about its own cards. The level to which 
the system can be explicit about its beliefs, its opponents 
beliefs about its beliefs, and its beliefs about its opponents 
beliefs about its beliefs is crucial to success in this game. 
For example, ‘bluffing’ in its simplest form is the act of 
making your opponents believe you have stronger (or 
weaker) cards than you do. If you believe that your 
opponents are undecided about the strength of your cards, 
then bluffing can be a good idea. It is a bad idea to bluff if 
you believe that your opponents are certain about the 
strength of your cards. 
Summary 
The vision of a completely general-purpose theory and 
architecture for self-aware systems is certainly not yet the 
state of the art.  It is, however, an excellent long-term 
vision in that it idealizes a strong thread of ongoing activity 
that is of both theoretical and practical interest. 
Machines do not need to be self-aware in the same way 
as humans do, but some forms of self-awareness seem to 
be useful.  For example, the ability to determine what a 
system knows and does not know what it can do and 
cannot do, and how it can be driven over a period of time 
in a way that is consistent with its goals.  Self-awareness 
can make the system more robust and self-repairing over  a 
period of time. 
There have been some implementations of self-aware 
systems that have explicit representations of the self and 
keep a history of its beliefs, actions, and interactions for 
use for use both in everyday reasoning and planning and in 
diagnosing and fixing failures. 
Research is needed to explore the forms of knowledge 
representation necessary to support self-aware computer 
systems, and to better understand the role(s) that self-
awareness can play in practical applications.  
Several simple applications of self-awareness to specific 
tasks are achievable in the near future, but some additional 
work is necessary to define a focused challenge problem 
that can carry the field forward in a more substantive way.  
Areas that might provide materials for the definition of a 
challenge problem include representing and reasoning 
about an agent’s knowledge (as is required by poker, 
Kriegspiel chess, and expert identification); and 
conversational systems and other systems that interact with 
humans in a social way, such as companions and 
automated tutors. 
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